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Abstract: 
This paper considers the cost savings arising from wind generation through the merit order 
effect in gross pool electricity markets, using the Irish electricity market as a case study. The 
Irish electricity market makes for a good testing ground due to the fact that it is a single 
market with very little interconnection to other markets, allowing impacts of wind to be more 
clearly identified than on a more interconnected system. Ireland also has extremely ambitious 
renewable energy targets, resulting in a high penetration of wind generation. The authors 
estimate the historic cost savings arising from wind generation in the Irish electricity market 
using an hourly time series OLS regression model for 2009. We find that the value of wind to 
the market dispatch has resulted in savings of €141 million to the market dispatch. We find 
that the total costs to the market would have been in the region of 12% higher over the course 
of the year had no wind output been available. These savings are significantly greater than the 
subsidy received for wind-generated electricity over this time period, and as a result it can be 
seen that the positive externalities derived from wind generated electricity outweigh the cost 
of the subsidy; particularly when one considers the CO2 saving to the market and accepts that 
all forms of generation impose integration costs to electricity systems. 
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1. Introduction 
As energy consumption has risen steadily over the past century, so too have emissions, 
contributing to climate change. This, alongside dwindling fossil fuel resources has resulted in 
increasing global interest in renewable generation, which allows for lower carbon emissions 
from electricity generation and contributes to policy targets such as the Kyoto Protocol 
(1992), US cap and trade programs such as the Clean Air Act (2008) and the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (European Commission 
2009). A key challenge internationally is the design of future electricity systems which will 
bring about emissions savings and fuel security at least cost.  
 
Due to the recent crisis in Japan, many nuclear programs have been put on hold, with other 
nations undergoing re-examination of their nuclear facilities post Fukushima (Schneider, 
Froggatt et al. 2011).  This will have implications for renewable energy resources, as they are 
consequently considered a viable alternative to conventional generation with zero or lower 
emissions. Of the renewable technologies currently available for electricity generation, wind 
is one of the most developed and as a result gaining significant market shares internationally. 
This has resulted in greater focus on the impact of wind on the electricity system, as until 
quite recently no system had faced the challenges associated with high penetrations of wind – 
namely the need for greater flexibility and reserve due to the increase in volatility (NERC 
2008; NREL 2011). 
 
The benefits associated with wind generation include a reduction in fossil fuel consumption 
for electricity generation, environmental benefits, diversity of supply, reduced reliance on 
international fuel price fluctuations, and the meeting of national and international policy 
targets. Holttinen et al. (2009) observe that as wind replaces fossil fuels for electricity 
generation, total operational costs and emissions are reduced. It is noted by Clifford and 
Clancy (2011) that wind generation acts as a hedge against high fuel costs by depressing the 
wholesale cost of electricity.  
 
Much of the literature surrounding the increased penetration of renewables focuses on the 
additional costs associated with renewable generation, and, in the case of wind, increased 
levels of variability and unpredictability (Troy, Denny et al. 2010) rather than on the 
associated benefits. Smith et al. (2007) found that integrating high levels of wind can affect 
both transmission and generation through utility system planning and operations. They found 
that this is driven primarily through increased load-following and unit commitment costs. 
Dale et al. (2004) establish that, as the level of wind generation increases in an electricity 
market, extra balancing costs are incurred in the form of additional reserve and frequency 
response. They also indicate that as wind farms tend to be located in rural and often remote 
areas, wind generation tends to have a significant effect on transmission costs. The extra 
reserve costs are also observed in Denny and O‟Malley (2007), as wind is shown to increase 
uncertainty in the system as it is reasonably unpredictable and non-dispatchable. Holttinen et 
al. (2009) found that adding wind to an electricity system results in added integration costs, 
which relate to the extra investment and operational costs associated with the non-wind 
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generating units. Wind generation has also been shown to result in the increased cycling of 
existing units (Troy, Denny et al. 2010). This relates to start-ups, ramping and operation at 
part load which is caused by adding more variability to a power system (Denny and O'Malley 
2009; Troy, Denny et al. 2010). Milligan et al. (2011) also found that systems with significant 
levels of variable and uncertain primary energy sources require different operation than 
electricity systems based exclusively on  conventional resources. However, they point out 
that integration costs to power systems are imposed by all forms of generators – such as gas 
scheduling restrictions and hydro generators with dissolved gas limitations – yet these costs 
are not allocated to the generators in question. Denny and O‟Malley (2006) demonstrate that 
while wind can reduce the emissions of an electricity market, it is dependent on the method 
of system operation. 
 
Costs savings have been examined based on the above benefits, however very little has been 
done from the price reduction perspective. Various studies to date have shown that increased 
wind power in the generation mix would lead to reductions in the Spot Market Price   
(Moesgaard and Morthorst 2008; Sensfuß, Ragwitz et al. 2008; Pöyry 2010), however these 
have largely involved simulated wind production and prices as opposed to historical data. 
Results from Moesgaard and Morthorst (2008) illustrate that wind power benefits the 
consumer through economic as well as environmental benefits, yet that the price reducing 
effect could be higher than the studies estimate, while Sensfuß et al. (2008) indicate that the 
cost for renewable support paid by consumers is not as high as is generally expected when the 
merit order effect is taken into account. The All Island Grid Study (DCENR 2008) found that 
“at higher proportions of renewable capacity installed, less conventional capacity is required 
to run and thus the operational cost decreases”. In reality, markets will differ from results 
seen by models assumed in such studies as they are based on the assumption that a well 
functioning market will optimise costs,  and so total cost savings will be different for these 
compared to market savings which we identify. 
 
This paper aims to consider the historic cost savings arising from wind generation in 2009 in 
the Irish electricity market. The Irish electricity market makes for a good testing ground due 
to the fact that it is a single market with very little interconnection to other markets, which 
would enable it to better manage variability and uncertainty. Ireland also has extremely 
ambitious renewable energy targets, resulting in a high penetration of wind generation. We 
use a time series OLS regression model in order to consider the magnitude of the impact of 
wind on an hourly basis over the course of 2009. This study will not attempt to estimate the 
costs incurred as a result of wind integration, valuing only the savings to the market, which 
are often overlooked within the literature. Once the average hourly effect has been calculated, 
we can estimate the cost of electricity over the course of the year had no wind been available. 
 
Wind generation typically receives a subsidy in order to compensate it for its positive 
external benefits, which include the reduction in fossil fuel consumption for electricity 
generation, environmental benefits, supply diversification, reduced susceptibility to 
international fuel price fluctuations, and the meeting of national and international policy 
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targets. We endeavour to quantify these positive externalities. This will then be compared to 
the subsidy for wind generated electricity over this time period and the cost of carbon in order 
to observe whether the financial benefits of wind outweigh the costs and therefore whether 
the subsidies currently received by wind are justified. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows; Section 2 outlines the theoretical 
framework and merit order effect of wind on supply and demand, and Section 3 introduces 
the Irish electricity market as the case system. Section 4 details the model and data used and 
the results, discussion and conclusion are presented in Sections 5, and 6 respectively. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Electricity is a homogenous good, to which suppliers are indifferent between generators, as 
there is no product differentiation
2
. The market is capacity constrained; with each generator 
limited in their supply by the maximum output they are capable of producing. As a result, we 
can describe the generation of electricity as a Cournot oligopoly model, whereby generators 
are able to choose their level of supply but not the price which they receive for the electricity 
that they generate. The price of electricity is therefore determined by market demand;   
    . Generators still have market power, as each firm's output decision affects the price 
of electricity, and their rival‟s output level. 
 
In a simple 2 firm example, we assume that demand is fixed and supply is split between the 
two firms;           . Each firm must take into account its rival‟s behaviour, and will 
maximise its own profit level and output given that of its rival, which is considered to be a 
fixed amount,          .  Both firms are assumed in this example to initially have identical 
costs,      . Supply of electricity is split between both firms equally. 
 
As Firm 1 begins to generate a portion of its electricity portfolio output through wind 
generation, it can now supply electricity at a lower average marginal cost (MC) (since wind 
has a MC = 0) than previously. Firm 1 will benefit from this change in costs in two ways; 
firstly due to the fact that the quantities of electricity produced from competing firms are 
strategic substitutes, meaning that as wind output increases, rival generators will produces 
less as demand is held constant, and secondly because the Cournot-Nash outcome of a firm 
depends on the costs of its rival.  
 
Price in a Cournot oligopoly is determined by market demand, with            . This 
shows   to be equal to a constant,  , less each firm‟s output,     , by a given value. 
                                                 
2
 This is not necessarily the case in markets with certain renewables schemes such as ROC in the UK, which is 
designed to incentivise renewable generation into the electricity generation market by placing an obligation on 
all UK suppliers of electricity to source an increasing proportion of their electricity from renewable sources 
OFGEM (2011). "Renewables Obligation." However, for the purposes of the theoretical model, this 
homogenous assumption is justified. 
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This means that if Firm 1‟s costs fall below those of Firm 2 (  <   ), then the reaction 
function of Firm 1 is determined by    
            
  
. Industry output will remain constant 
as the shift is taking place between firms only, and demand is in no way affected by this 
change in supply. Theoretically both firms could continue to increase the proportion of wind 
in their portfolio up to 100%, which would result in the same proportion of electricity being 
produced, but at a MC = 0. This however is not feasible in practice as it does not consider the 
fixed cost element of a generators portfolio. 
 
Wind generation affects the intersection of the merit order (supply curve) with the demand 
curve; Figure 2 demonstrates that it essentially shifts the demand curve for conventional 
generation to the left as it can be considered as the demand for electricity less the amount of 
wind generated, resulting in the demand for conventional supply. Wind can be considered as 
negative demand due to its zero marginal cost, and the fact that it has priority dispatch – 
meaning that all electricity produced by wind in Europe must be given priority access to the 
grid by the transmission system operator (European Commission 2001). This is because once 
the supply curve is defined and it is compared to demand, the System Marginal Price is set to 
the bid price of the most expensive plant required to meet demand (CER 2007; Devitt, 
Diffney et al. 2008; Clifford and Clancy 2011). This is known as the Merit Order Effect 
(MOE), which arises from the fact that, all else equal, adding wind power to the system 
should replace higher marginal cost plant on the system, and this in turn is likely to lower 
wholesale electricity prices (Indecon 2008; Felder 2011).    
 
 
 
Figure 1 Sample Merit Order Effect 
 
 As wind generated electricity comes online, it reduces the amount of conventional generation 
required to meet demand. Electricity is a homogenous good therefore less expensive 
generation will be consumed first, and wind has a marginal cost = 0. This shifts the demand 
for conventional generation to the left, resulting in a fall in the system marginal price from 
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SMP1 to SMP2 shown in Figure 2. Depending on the amount of wind available and the level 
of demand in a given time period, this price reduction will vary significantly. 
3. Irish Electricity System 
The Irish gross pool electricity market is an ideal test case for identifying the merit order 
effect of wind generation, as it is a small, isolated system with little existing interconnection 
to other systems - at present there is only one interconnector between Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland which operates at 400MW, with another of 500 MW capacity expected to be 
online by 2012 (Valeri 2009). Ireland is also highly dependent on fuel imports, in 2007 
Ireland imported 88.3% of its energy needs – one of the highest levels of energy imports in 
the EU, after only Luxembourg (97.5%), Malta (100%) and Cyprus (95.9%) (Eurostat 2011). 
As a result, Ireland is very susceptible to shocks in energy prices and needs to encourage as 
diverse a fuel mix as possible in order to protect its security of supply.  
 
In Ireland, wind accounted for 68% of the renewable energy used for electricity generation 
and over 10% of all electricity generated in 2009, and by June 2011 had reached an installed 
capacity of  1459MW (SEAI 2009; SEAI 2010; Eirgrid 2011). The substitution of 
conventional energy sources with renewable energy sources such as wind energy offers 
considerable potential for reducing a nation‟s carbon emissions and meeting national and 
international policy targets (DCENR 2007; European Commission 2009). Since the 2009 
European Directive, all EU countries are required to increase their renewable proportion so 
that 20% renewable energy is achieved on average across member states by 2020 (European 
Commission 2009). With regards to Ireland this target is set at 16% renewables of total final 
consumption – which incorporates the use of renewables in electricity, transport and heat 
sectors. Within the electricity sector specifically, Ireland has a target of 40% from renewable 
sources to be achieved by 2020, of which wind promises to be a major contributor 
(Government of Ireland 2008). 
4. Methods 
In this study we generate a times series multiple regression model. Controls are included for 
each hour of the day, day of the week, month and public holidays, as all of these have an 
effect on the demand for electricity, the availability of wind for generation, and the scheduled 
maintenance of conventional plant which has an effect on the fuel mix. Murray (2009) 
highlights that while the price is very closely linked to the demand level in power markets; it 
tends to be stratified as it reflects the different types of plant which are brought into service 
on a merit order basis.    
 
Irish hourly data for 2009 from the Single Electricity Market (SEM) is used to identify the 
main drivers of the shadow price
3
 through an OLS regression model. It is expected for the 
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 It should be noted that this price is not a shadow price in the economic sense, in that it is not is the value of the 
Lagrange multiplier at the optimal solution. However, the Irish market documentation refers to the shadow price 
(essentially SMP in Figure1) so for consistency we will continue to use this terminology here. 
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Irish system that the most accurate predictors of the shadow price would be the fuel input 
prices of oil, gas, coal and carbon price from the day prior to bidding (when bids must be 
made), and demand and marginal capacity of the day in question. The Shadow Price in a 
given period is set at the marginal cost of the most expensive unit required to meet demand in 
the same period. This is consistent with the guidelines for bidding set out in the Irish 
electricity market (CER 2007; SEM-O 2010), and is described in the following equation: 
 
                            
              
                
                                
                            
 
Net demand refers to total system demand less demand that is met through peat output and 
imports at time t
4
, which is measured on an hourly basis. Gas Coal, Oil and Carbon relate to 
the daily spot prices of these fuels on the global exchange, as the Irish Regulator requires 
units to bid their fuel costs in this manner. These are set and bid into the market on the day 
ahead in practice, and therefore are lagged by 24 periods.  
As demand increases towards total possible supply available, one would expect prices to 
increase dramatically due to a scarcity premium. In order to see if this is taking place, we 
include a marginal capacity (“MarCap”) variable in the model, which can be described as 
MWOffline / Demand - the number of megawatts which are unavailable for generation as 
reported by each individual generating unit. This is essentially the difference between the 
maximum rated number of megawatts a unit is able to supply and their actual availability in a 
given hour. This is included in the model in order to identify whether a scarcity premium is 
found to be significant, with a fall in availability resulting in an increase in the price of 
electricity. 
 
The following table provides summary statistics for all observations of variables included 
within this study:  
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Units Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
ShadowPrice € 8682 36.044 12.438 14.485 146.570 
Net Demand MW 8682 3380.589 820.180 1469.879 5862.166 
Wind MW 8682 426.933 318.007 0.890 1322.626 
MarCap MW 8682 4.313 3.196 0.991 24.701 
Oil € 8682 44.366 6.874 28.157 54.316 
Gas € 8682 34.635 13.274 15.505 77.094 
Coal € 8682 51.173 5.463 44.120 65.040 
Carbon € 8682 13.353 1.542 8.200 15.900 
 
                                                 
4
 As peat and imports do not bid into the Irish electricity pool. 
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5.  Results 
Table 2 presents the results of the main drivers of shadow price using the fuel prices lagged 
by 24 hours with robust standard errors. Observations with electricity prices exceeding €150 
have been omitted from the model, as prices of this level can be attributed to technical failure 
rather than normal operation; observations missing values for load have also be omitted.  
Multicollinearity was tested for, and rejected, by analysing the correlations of the estimated 
coefficients as opposed to the variables of the independent variables. Serial correlation was not 
detected. 
 
All independent variables are found to be statistically significant at the 99% level with the 
exception of the price of coal; as coal serves as a baseload fuel it tends not to set the price of 
electricity and therefore will not directly affect the shadow price of electricity. Gas and oil do 
however set the price at varying points along the demand curve, and are therefore highly 
significant in driving the cost of electricity. The coefficient on gas (0.5607) is around 5 times 
greater than that of oil (0.1016);  this is most likely explained by the fact that just under 60% 
of Ireland‟s installed conventional capacity uses natural gas (SEAI 2009). The marginal 
capacity (“MarCap”) variable identifies that there is a statistically significant scarcity 
premium with regards to the availability of generation; a 1MW increase in the ratio of 
unavailable plant divided by total demand (the load) results in a price reduction of 
€0.26/MWh.   
Table 2 Regression Output 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Shadow 
  
Demandk -15.3778*** 
 (1.256) 
Demandk
2
 2.7562*** 
 (0.204) 
Wind -0.0099*** 
 (0.001) 
Wind
2
 0.0000*** 
 (0.000) 
MarCap -0.2575*** 
 (0.042) 
GasLag 0.5607*** 
 (0.018) 
OilLag 0.1016*** 
 (0.039) 
CoalLag -0.0452 
 (0.064) 
CarbonLag 0.2679*** 
 (0.100) 
Constant 36.2638*** 
 (5.196) 
  
Observations 8,664 
R-squared 0.8133 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The net demand has a positive effect on the price, as an increase in net demand causes a 
movement up the merit curve to more expensive generating units, causing the price to 
increase. This relationship is not linear as both net demand and its square are found to be 
statistically significant at the 99% level.  Irish demand can be seen to be highly cyclical and 
predictable, as are the prices over time. Figure 3 below represents Demand and Price in the 
first eight days of June 2011. 
 
  
Figure 2 Load & Pool Price end of June 2011 
 
The squared output of wind, while significant, is equal to €/MWh 0.0000 and therefore we 
can assume that the relationship between the shadow price of electricity and the output of 
wind to be a linear one. The coefficient on wind is -0.0099, meaning that an increase of one 
MW of wind on the Irish system led, on average over the course of 2009, to a fall in the 
shadow price of €0.0099/MWh. In isolation, this may not seem to be a significant amount, 
particularly given that the mean Shadow Price is €36.044, therefore we will re-estimate our 
model on an hourly level in order to find the value of the coefficient on wind at each hour in 
order to value the total saving to the system from having wind more accurately. As wind 
reduces the demand for generation with higher marginal costs, its value will depend on the 
demand at the time and the cost of the units it displaces. As a result, using the hourly 
coefficient should give a reasonable indication of the true shadow price saving on an hourly 
level; Figure 3 below presents the hourly coefficients on wind.  
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Figure 3 Wind Coefficient 
 
The results show what the value of wind was to the Irish system in 2009, controlling for day 
of the week and month in question. As expected, the greatest saving to the market coincides 
with both peak demand and prices, as wind generation at 7pm represents the greatest saving 
along the merit curve. The value of wind is directly related to the units which it displaces, 
which is why the value of -0.0189 seen at 7pm is more than double the coefficient seen at 
7am (-0.0046). 
 
In order to quantify the price benefit, these coefficients are then multiplied by the historical 
wind outputs and system demand at each hour of 2009, as shown equation 2 below. The 
Shadow price of electricity is set by at the marginal cost of the most expensive generator 
required to meet demand in a given period. As a result, each MW generated receives the same 
shadow price; a reduction in this price due to wind reduces the price paid to each generator 
for each unit of electricity that they produce. This allows us to calculate the total saving at 
each hour of the day which is attributable to wind.  
 
                             
 
The results show that the value of wind to the market dispatch has resulted in savings of €141 
million in 2009. Ireland‟s highest daily levels of wind coincide with peak demand, resulting 
in a significant saving; countries that experience highest wind levels during the night, or 
periods of low demand may not see the same level of cost savings. The total market dispatch 
amounted to € 1,284 million over the course of 2009, meaning that if wind output had not 
been available, the total costs would have been approximately 12% higher than actual values 
seen. Over this time period the total subsidy received by renewables in the Irish electricity 
market amounted to €48 million. This relates to the PSO levy in relation to the REFIT and 
AER schemes, net of administration costs and any interest. The PSO is a levy charged to all 
electricity customers in Ireland which is designed to recoup the additional costs incurred by 
purchasing electricity from specified sources, including sustainable, renewable and 
indigenous sources (CER 2006). This means that the total PSO in 2009 (which is not 
exclusive to wind generated electricity) is almost three times less than the estimated savings 
of wind to the dispatch market.  
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Using the SEAI (2009) average emissions for the Irish electricity market, we can estimate the 
carbon savings arising from the displaced fossil fuel generation. This value of 0.582 kg/MWh 
CO2 is multiplied by the wind output at each hour and the daily carbon price for the same 
time period lagged by 24 hours, as shown in equation 3. This aggregates to a saving of €29.3 
million over the course of 2009. This saving is assumed to be accounted for in our regression 
model. EPA (2009) values of SO2 and NOx for electricity generation are used to assess the 
savings of this emissions arising from wind generation. These are estimated at €0.5 million 
and €7.9 million respectively. 
 
As demonstrated in the analysis, this result is heavily dependent on both the level of wind 
output and total demand at each point in time, and therefore predicting future cost savings 
will be highly dependent on the assumptions surrounding these parameters. It should also be 
noted that results are exclusive to the test system, and further study would be needed if 
attempting to calculate the benefits to other systems. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper estimates the historic cost savings arising from wind generation in the Irish 
electricity market using a time series OLS regression model in 2009. This allows us to 
calculate the extent of the value of wind on an hourly basis over the period analysed. Once 
the average hourly effect is calculated, we aggregate the total and find that the value of wind 
to the market dispatch has resulted in savings are of €141 million to the market dispatch. We 
find that the total costs to the market would have been in the region of 12% higher over the 
course of the year had no wind output been available. These savings are significantly greater 
than the subsidy received for wind-generated electricity over this time period, and as a result 
it can be seen that the positive externalities derived from wind generated electricity outweigh 
the cost of the subsidy; particularly when one considers the CO2 saving to the market and 
accepts that all forms of generation impose integration costs to electricity systems. 
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